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Abstract 
A central question for philosophical psychology is which mental faculties form natural kinds. 
There is hot debate over the kind status of faculties as diverse as consciousness, seeing, 
concepts, emotions, constancy and the senses. In this paper, I take emotions and concepts as 
my main focus, and argue that questions over the kind status of these faculties are complicated 
by the undeservedly overlooked fact that natural kinds are indeterminate in certain ways. I 
will show that indeterminacy issues have led to an impasse in the debates over emotions and 
concepts. I examine possible ways to resolve this impasse, and argue against one of them. I 
then suggest a different method, which places more emphasis on a close analysis of  predictive 
and explanatory practices in psychology. I argue that when we apply this method, a new 
position emerges: that it is indeterminate whether concepts or emotions are natural kinds. 
They are neither determinately natural kinds, nor determinately not natural kinds. Along the 
way, we will see that natural kinds have been put to two completely different theoretical uses, 
which are often been blurred together, and that they are ill-suited to fulfil one of them. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most pressing questions in cognitive science is which mental faculties (if any) are 
natural kinds. There is extensive debate over the kind status of perception (Burge 2010), 
consciousness (Irvine 2013, Shea 2012), seeing (Block 2012), colour constancy (Davies 2016), 
the senses (Nudds 2011), attention (Prinz 2012), emotions (Griffiths 1997, Prinz 2002) and 
concepts (Machery 2009). This list could be extended. 
Why are these questions so important? By investigating which faculties are natural kinds, 
we aim to discover which categories pick out genuine scientifically interesting divisions in 
nature, worthy of investigation. This is opposed to the categories that pick out groups of 
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entities that have no scientific interest or import. Identifying natural kinds and disregarding 
categories that are not natural kinds is a key source of progress in science as a whole.  
Many have suggested that certain mental faculties be dropped from scientific study, 
because they are not natural kinds. Paul Griffiths says: 
‘It is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the  
vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a  
unified scientific psychology of the emotions… emotions are not a natural kind’  
(2004a, pp.901-902). 
Griffiths concludes that the term ‘emotion’ should be: 
‘eliminated from our psychological vocabulary’ (1997, p.15). 
 Edouard Machery says something similar about concepts: 
‘A growing amount of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind’ 
(2005, p.445). 
Machery then claims that: 
‘“concept” ought to be eliminated from psychology’ (2009, p.246).2  
I will start by examining the account of natural kinds that these debates rely on, which is 
the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view. By examining indeterminacy in the HPC view, I 
will show how the debates over the kind status of emotions and concepts have reached an 
impasse (§§2-4). I then investigate ways that we might decide whether emotions and concepts 
are kinds, and thus how we might resolve this impasse. I draw a distinction between two quite 
different theoretical roles that the HPC view has been put to, which I call the taxonomic and 
metaphysical roles. I argue that the HPC view is ill-suited to fulfil the taxonomic role, because 
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of issues pertaining to indeterminacy (§5). I thus dismiss one method for resolving the 
question of whether emotions and concepts are kinds. Finally, I suggest another method, 
which is much more closely focussed on an examination of the predictive and explanatory 
practices of psychology. I argue that when we deploy this method in the case of emotions and 
concepts, the result we get is that it is indeterminate whether they are kinds or non-kinds (§6). 
I close by drawing out some consequences of these arguments (§7). For reasons of space, I will 
mainly focus on emotions and concepts, but many of the points apply generally. So, the paper 
should be seen as making general observations about psychological kindhood, with emotions 
and concepts as concrete case studies. 
2. Homeostatic Property Clusters 
Ultimately, one of the main purposes of this paper is to argue for the claim that it is 
indeterminate whether emotions and concepts are natural kinds. However, before we can do 
this, we must settle certain issues concerning how best to go about assessing whether or not 
they are kinds. That is the job of the first part of the paper. Once we have a clear idea of the 
best method for assessing kindhood, we will be able to tackle the issue of the kind status of 
emotions and concepts directly. 
There are many differing accounts of natural kinds. However, when we consult the 
literature, we find that the overwhelmingly dominant view (at least as far as biology and 
psychology are concerned) is the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account, from Richard 
Boyd (1989, 1991, 1999a,b, 2003, 2010a,b and 2013). The HPC view has a wide following 
(Kornblith 1993, Wilson et al. 2007), and it has even been described as the ‘consensus’ (Samuels 
and Ferreira 2010, p.222) or ‘received’ view (Ereshefsky and Reydon 2015, p.969).  
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There are certain core features of the HPC account that will be important for this paper. 
The first is that members of a kind must instantiate a ‘property cluster’: a set of properties that 
reliably repeats itself in nature in ‘an important number of cases’ (Boyd 1989, p.16; 1991, 
p.129). It is not the case that all of the entities within the kind must instantiate all of the 
properties within the cluster. Rather, instantiation of the properties can admit of exceptions 
(1989, p.16). In this way, Boyd distances himself from traditional kind essentialism (e.g. Ellis 
2002). 
This property cluster alone is insufficient for kindhood: the properties must also be 
underwritten by a homeostatic mechanism: a (typically causal) mechanism that generates the 
properties in the cluster (Boyd 1989, p.16). This mechanism explains why the properties tend 
to cluster together. It also explains why it is possible to infer from the fact that some members 
of the kind instantiate certain properties to the claim that other members of the kind will 
probably instantiate those properties: because these properties are caused by the same 
mechanism (Boyd 1991, p.130-131 and 1999a, p.68). 
This is connected with Boyd’s insistence that the properties in the cluster should be 
determined by the causal structure of the world, rather than by a priori stipulation (Boyd 1989, 
p.16). Boyd says:  
‘the unity of the property-cluster which defines [the kind] is causal rather than 
conceptual… a natural kind is associated causally with a large family of 
methodologically important properties’ (1991, p.141). 
This quotation raises two important points. First, Boyd insists that there must be a large 
number of properties in the cluster that defines the kind. Second, Boyd insists that the 
properties in the cluster must be ‘methodologically important’. By this, Boyd means that the 
properties must be of interest to the scientific discipline that is examining it, and that they must 
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be useful for scientifically interesting generalisations, predictions and explanations. Boyd is 
explicit on this issue (1999 p.69; 1999b; 2003, p.538 and 2013, p.53). We will return to these 
points below. 
Boyd’s influence on the debates concerning the kind status of mental faculties is clear. 
Machery explicitly allies his account with Boyd’s (2005, pp.447-448). Like Boyd, Machery 
emphasises that members of a kind must share: 
‘a large set of scientifically relevant properties… because of some common causal 
mechanism’ (2005, p.447-448. Cf. 2009, p.232). 
Griffiths is also explicitly in agreement with Boyd in his discussion of emotions. He 
spends much time developing the HPC view (1997 chs. 7-9). Griffiths also emphasises that 
members must be underwritten by a homeostatic mechanism (1997, p.242), an idea that is 
inspired by Boyd’s work (Griffiths cites Boyd extensively).  
3. A Space of Kinds 
In this section, I show that the HPC view can fail to give a determinate answer to whether a 
certain set of entities counts as a natural kind. I attribute this to three main factors. I suggest 
that this indeterminacy contributes to making the view ill-suited to helping us decide whether 
a certain collection of entities counts as a kind. In §4, we will apply these issues to questions 
concerning emotions and concepts. I must be clear that this section is not intended in the spirit 
of hostility toward the HPC view. To say that the HPC is ill-suited for this role is not to criticise 
it, because as we shall see later, there are good reasons to think that the HPC view should not 
be deployed in this role at all. 
The first factor comes from vagueness in language. As noted above, Boyd and his 
followers claim that members of a kind must tend to share a ‘large’ number of properties in 
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order to qualify as a natural kind. Obviously, the word ‘large’ is vague. This raises an issue: 
how we interpret Boyd’s account will depend upon how strictly we interpret this vague 
criterion. For example, someone who interprets ‘large’ as meaning a very great many properties 
would be more likely to exclude a certain collection of properties shared by a group of entities 
from qualifying those entities as forming a kind. Conversely, someone who interpreted ‘large’ 
in a more liberal way would be more permissive, and would be willing to count far fewer 
common properties as sufficient for a group of entities to count as a kind. These two 
interpretations of Boyd would deliver very different constraints on what it takes for 
something to count as a HPC kind. Two thinkers could then examine the same collection of 
entities, and one would claim that they do not form a HPC kind, whilst the other would insist 
that they do, simply as a result of these different constraints. Because of vagueness in the term 
‘large’, the HPC view does not give a determinate answer to the question of how many 
properties must be present for something to count as a kind. 
Vagueness in language also leads to problems when we consider other elements of Boyd’s 
view. We noted that one criterion that a collection of entities must fulfil to be a HPC kind is 
that it must be possible to make a large number of scientific generalisations about the entities 
in question. Once again, this introduces vagueness into the view, regarding how many 
generalizations would have to hold true, or how successful such inductive practices would 
have to be.  
A second factor contributing to indeterminacy over whether the HPC view counts a 
certain set of entities as a kind comes from fineness of grain. One thinker could claim that a set 
of entities counts as a natural kind because they tend to share some properties specified at an 
extremely coarse-grained level of detail. Someone else could insist that the class of entities 
must share properties at a much more fine-grained level of analysis.  
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A third factor concerns mechanisms. Recall that the HPC view involves the claim that the 
properties in the cluster are supported by a common causal homeostatic mechanism. There is 
no consensus on the nature of psychological mechanisms (Bechtel 2008, Piccinini and Craver 
2011, Machamer et al. 2000, Illari and Williamson 2012). However, on all of these accounts of 
what a ‘psychological mechanism’ is, there is room for disagreement similar to those noted 
above. For example, suppose we take the individuation conditions on mechanisms to be their 
inputs, outputs and intermediate processes (Machamer et al. 2000). Even if all parties agree 
on this, it is clearly true that all three of these elements can be specified at different levels of 
grain. One party could insist on specifying inputs, outputs and processes at a coarse-grain, 
whilst the other party could demand that more fine-grained distinctions be made between 
different varieties of input, output and processes. Different opinions on these matters will lead 
to differences in whether something counts as one mechanism or not, which can obviously 
result in a difference of opinion over whether some properties are supported by the same 
mechanism or not, and a resultant disagreement about kindhood. In a sense, we can see this 
third factor as an application of the second factor (fineness of grain) to the individuation of 
mechanisms. 
I have outlined three factors that can result in the HPC account’s inability to give a 
determinate answer to whether a certain group of entities is a kind: vagueness in language, 
fineness of grain in the individuation of properties and the correct individuation of 
mechanisms. We can imagine a multi-dimensional space of different interpretations of the 
HPC account. Because of the three factors, it is possible to interpret Boyd’s account in a more 
liberal, or a more strict way along several different dimensions. These differences will deliver 
different verdicts on the question of whether a certain collection of entities is a natural kind. 
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In what follows, we will see precisely how these considerations interact with the debates over 
emotions and concepts. 
Two important clarifications: first, I am not saying that the HPC view will never allow us 
to decide whether a particular group of entities is a kind or not. Even with such a vast space 
of possible interpretations, there might be clear-cut cases. Second, this section is only meant 
to demonstrate the vagueness in the HPC view itself when it comes to deciding whether a 
group of entities forms a kind, not claim that there is no way to decide whether a group of 
entities forms a kind.  
4. Concepts and Emotions 
We now turn to examining some concrete cases where the considerations outlined in §3 have 
impact on questions of psychological kindhood.  
4.1 Concepts 
Machery argues that concepts themselves do not form a kind, but claims that there exist three 
individual sorts of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories), each of which is itself a kind 
(2009). Machery explicitly relies upon the HPC view in his argument. He bases his argument 
on the claim that concepts do not share a large set of scientifically interesting properties, which 
permit many generalisations (2005, p.450; 2009, pp.241-242). In this respect, Machery is 
directly using the HPC view to give criteria by which to judge kindhood. Furthermore, (as we 
shall see) Machery invokes the criteria for natural kindhood given by Boyd at many points in 
order to respond to his critics. 3  
																																																								
3	Terminological	point:	Machery	reserves	the	term	‘natural	kind’	for	homeostatic	cluster	kinds	that	support	many	
interesting	 generalisations	 (2010b,	 p.238).	 	 So	 on	 this	 terminology	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 something	 to	 be	 a	
homeostatic	 cluster	 kind	 and	not	a	 natural	 kind.	 I	will	 stick	 to	 the	 nomenclature	 on	which	 these	 terms	 are	
interchangeable,	but	nothing	will	turn	on	this.	
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One of Machery’s most prominent opponents is Dan Weiskopf.4 He thinks that concepts 
are a natural kind (2009, 2010).5 Weiskopf agrees with Machery that prototypes, exemplars 
and theories are each natural kinds. The point of difference is that Weiskopf believes that the 
overall class of concepts taken as a whole is a natural kind, which has the various other kinds 
as sub-kinds, whilst Machery rejects this claim.  
Weiskopf’s argument is that there are several important properties that are shared by all 
concepts, and several interesting generalisations that can be made about them (notice that 
these arguments are explicitly based upon criteria from the HPC view). Weiskopf argues that 
one such property is conceptual combination: all concepts can be combined with at least some 
other concepts (according to certain syntactic rules) to produce thoughts that have those 
concepts as constituents. For example, we combine WOODEN and SPOON to form the 
concept WOODEN SPOON (Weiskopf 2009, pp.164-165). 
This is Machery’s response: 
‘[the claim that all concepts are involved in conceptual combination] is correct. It is, 
however, unclear why this is taken to justify conserving the notion of concept. Evidence 
suggests that in conceptual combination, prototypes, exemplars, and theories fulfil 
different functions… Thus, prototypes, exemplars and theories are likely to be used by 
different subprocesses of the process underwriting concept combination’ (2009, p.245). 
Weiskopf is points out that all concepts are involved in conceptual combination, and he 
is happy to accept this abstract and coarse-grained property as sufficient to count as a 
scientifically relevant property, which aids the case that concepts are a natural kind. Machery 
																																																								
4	For	others,	see	Piccinini	and	Scott	(2006),	Margolis	and	Laurence	(2010),	Strohminger	and	Moore	(2010).	
5	Weiskopf’s	understanding	of	kinds	is:	‘Kinds	are	understood	here	as	groupings	of	entities	that	participate	in	a	
body	of	empirically	discovered	reliable	generalizations,	and	which	participate	 in	those	generalizations	due	to	
some	set	of	properties	they	have	in	common’	(2009,	p.147).		
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responds by insisting that at a finer level of analysis, the processes involved in ‘conceptual 
combination’ are different (they fulfil different functions, and work in different ways).  
Also in support of his claim that concepts form a natural kind, Weiskopf points out that 
concepts are all stored in long-term memory (2009, pp.166-167). Machery responds: 
‘[concepts] are stored in long-term memory all right, but the rules that govern storage, 
permanence, and retrieval are likely to be different.’ (2009, p.245). 
To Weiskopf, ‘being stored in long term memory’ is sufficient to count as a scientifically 
interesting property, and thus the fact that concepts share this property can aid his case that 
concepts are a natural kind. To Machery, this is not enough. Machery demands that they must 
all have similarity at a finer grain of analysis: they must all be stored in long term memory in 
the same way, following the same set of rules.  
The links of this to §3 should be clear: Weiskopf and Machery are placing different 
constraints upon how much various entities must have in common in order to count them as 
a natural kind. Weiskopf is liberal, he only requires concepts to share a few properties, 
specified at a coarse-grain of analysis in order to count concepts as a natural kind. Machery is 
stricter, for him concepts must share more properties, and they must exist at a much finer grain. 
We find similar issues elsewhere. Samuels and Ferreira (2010) point out various 
properties that concepts share, and various generalisations that can be made about them, 
arguing that this qualifies them for kindhood. Machery’s response is to defer to the HPC 
account of natural kinds and insist that the properties Samuels and Ferreira mention only 
support ‘few’ as opposed to ‘many’ scientific generalizations, and that this disqualifies them 
from counting as a natural kind (2010b, pp.237-238). Again, a strict interpretation of the claim 
that natural kinds must support ‘many’ interesting generalisations will deliver a verdict in 
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line with Machery; a more liberal interpretation will vindicate the converse verdict.6 This 
occurs yet elsewhere. Edwards opposes Machery’s view by insisting that concepts share 
various properties in common, though (by Edwards’ own admission) these are only very 
coarse-grained properties (2011, pp.125-129). 
The third factor highlighted in §3 (the level of grain at which to individuate mechanisms) 
is also relevant. Weiskopf argues that all concepts are involved in conceptual acquisition, a 
property that is underwritten by the mechanism of ‘structural alignment’ (2009, p.165-166).7   
Machery’s response is: 
‘it is unlikely that except at a very coarse grain, the processes involved in the acquisition 
of prototypes and of exemplars are really similar.’ (2009, p.245). 
Weiskopf is happy with an abstract characterisation of the mechanism that underpins 
conceptual acquisition, Machery demands a more fine-grained specification of the 
mechanism.  
At this point, the following suggestion may be made: the fact that concepts share at least 
some properties or mechanisms (albeit at an abstract level) indicates that they are natural 
kinds, but that it is very often useful to make divisions amongst sub-kinds, and invoke the 
more specific properties that Machery mentions. However, this suggestion simply begs the 
question against Machery. After all, Machery’s claim is that these properties and mechanisms 
do not qualify concepts for kind status at all, whether or not these kinds contain sub-kinds. So 
we cannot assume that these properties and mechanisms are sufficient for kindhood without 
question begging. 
																																																								
6	Machery	and	Samuels	and	Ferreira	both	mention	that	natural	kinds	are	vague	(Machery	2010b,	p.238;	2005,	
p.448	and	Samuels	and	Ferreira	2010,	p.223)	but	both	of	them	claim	that	their	interpretation	is	the	correct	one.		
7	Weiskopf’s	point	is	intended	to	apply	to	exemplars	and	prototypes,	not	theories.		
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4.2 Emotions 
Griffiths thinks that emotions aren’t a natural kind. Louis Charland (1995 and 2002) thinks 
they are. 8 He explicitly commits to the HPC view of natural kinds (2002, p.512). Charland’s 
argument for the claim that emotions are natural kinds is based around two claims. First, he 
argues that all emotions ‘involve their own distinct mode of representation’ (p.522). The kind 
of representation that Charland has in mind is that ‘emotions are normative or evaluative 
judgements’ (p.522), though (unlike cognitivists) he is not committed to the claim that these 
judgements are cognitive or propositional (they could be more akin to perception).9 He draws 
very heavily on Panksepp (1998) in this view. The second part of Charland’s argument is that 
‘there are reliable generalizations and principles of inference that govern emotional 
behaviour’ (p.522), though Charland admits that there are only a small number of laws that 
govern these (p.524). In short, according to Charland, all emotions are ‘felt affective’ 
representational states, and it is these unifying features are enough to qualify emotions as a 
kind.10  
Griffiths replies to Charland by saying that: 
																																																								
8	At	least,	he	claims	that	the	hypothesis	that	they	are	is	plausible	(2002,	p.526).	Terminological	point:	Charland	
expresses	his	view	by	saying	that	emotion	(singular)	is	a	natural	kind,	by	which	he	means	that	emotions	(plural)	
as	a	whole	form	a	natural	kind,	as	opposed	to	the	claim	that	some	individual	emotions	(such	as	fear	or	hate)	are	
natural	kinds	(2002).	In	this	paper,	when	I	say	that	emotion(s)	(in	the	singular	or	plural)	form	a	natural	kind,	I	
mean	that	the	category	as	a	whole	forms	a	kind.	I	won’t	discuss	the	kind	status	of	individual	emotions.	
9	Charland	also	claims	that	emotion	is	a	neurobiological	kind,	based	on	the	claim	that	different	emotions	share	
clusters	of	neurobiological	properties	across	mammalian	species	 (2002,	p.517-520).	Discussion	of	 this	would	
take	us	too	far	afield.	Even	if	emotions	are	a	neurobiological	kind,	it	doesn’t	follow	that	they	are	psychological	
kinds.	Something	can	be	a	kind	for	one	discipline,	but	not	another	(cf.	Boyd	1999b,	pp.159-160,	Magnus	2012,	
pp.39-45).	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	drawing	my	attention	to	this.	
10	Charland’s	method	deserves	comment.	Unlike	Griffiths,	Charland	does	not	examine	those	faculties	referred	
to	by	the	vernacular	category	 ‘emotion’.	Rather,	he	primarily	focusses	on	‘basic’	emotions	(2002,	p.531)	and	
argues	 from	 the	 claim	 that	organisms	 that	have	 emotions	 (‘emoters’)	 form	a	natural	 kind	 to	 the	 claim	 that	
emotion	is	a	natural	kind	(2002,	p.512).	This	method	is	interesting,	but	for	reasons	of	space	I	shall	discuss	it	no	
more	here.	
Forthcoming	in	Synthese.	Please	cite	published	version.		
	 13	
‘the category of felt affective states is so broad, it is natural within this framework to seek 
distinctive kinds of processes involving affective feelings’ (2004b, §2.2). 
Charland claims that emotions all share the property of being ‘felt affective states’, and 
claims that this is sufficient to count members of the category as natural kinds. Griffiths’ view 
is more divisive: he claims that the differences between different sorts of felt affective states 
shows that the category of felt affective states is not a natural kind. Charland uses the 
commonalities shared by some entities, specified at a coarse level of grain, and concludes that 
the entities are a natural kind. Griffiths insists that this is not enough, he demands more 
commonalities at a finer level of detail and concludes that they are not a natural kind. Similarly, 
Martha Nussbaum claims that all emotions have the unifying feature of being ‘evaluative 
judgements’ (2001). Griffiths’ reply follows the general theme that I have been uncovering, of 
claiming that there are important differences between kinds of evaluative judgements (2004b, 
§3).  
5. Two functions for the HPC view 
We have uncovered an impasse in the debates over concepts and emotions. The impasse has 
been traced to various common factors: differences of opinion over the number of properties, 
the level of grain of properties and the individuation of mechanisms that qualify entities for 
natural kindhood. How can we resolve this impasse? It should be clear that we cannot defer 
to the HPC view to help us here. This is because the HPC view is indeterminate in the ways 
outlined in §3: it does not itself tell us the level of grain at which to individuate properties and 
mechanisms, the number of properties that must be present, and so on. Deferring to the HPC 
view will not help us here, because the HPC view itself is just too indeterminate to deliver an 
answer one way or the other. My main focus has been on emotions and concepts, but of course 
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these three factors are features of the HPC view itself, so they are general problems that we 
should expect to arise with any project that relies on the HPC view to decide whether or not 
something is a kind. 
Does this mean that the HPC view should itself be rejected? No. The HPC view has been 
asked to fulfil at least two different theoretical roles. One is as a tool for carving up entities 
into kinds and non-kinds. On this role, the HPC view is treated like a cookie cutter: it is used 
to help us chunk reality up into kinds and non-kinds. Call this the taxonomic role. Boyd himself 
deploys the view in a taxonomic role, when he uses it to decide which biological categories 
form natural kinds. He primarily argues that species are natural kinds (1991, 1999b) but he 
also argues that higher taxa are too (2010b).11 The arguments of this paper provide some 
reason to be sceptical of the HPC view when it is deployed to fulfil the taxonomic role, because of 
the three sources of indeterminacy isolated above. 
However, this is not the only role that the view has been put to. One of Boyd’s main stated 
motivations for the HPC view is to explain in very general terms what the structure of natural 
kinds is, in a way that steers between the extremes of traditional essentialism and 
conventionalism. To Boyd and his followers, such a view must also be compatible with a 
sensible scientific realism (Boyd 1989, pp.6-9 and 1991, pp.127-133). In order to fulfil this role, 
an account of natural kinds must tell us very generally what sorts of things natural kinds are, 
how they are structured and what the core features of kinds are. Call this the metaphysical role.  
To fulfil this role, the account needs a certain amount of specificity: it needs to be specific 
enough to show how the features of HPC kinds differ from the features ascribed to kinds by 
																																																								
11Boyd’s	method	is	complex,	as	he	claims	that	the	HPC	view	should	itself	be	modified	when	it	is	applied	to	higher	
biological	taxa	in	order	to	fit	the	conclusion	that	they	are	natural	kinds	(2010b).	Analysis	of	these	issues	is	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	paper.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	drawing	my	attention	to	this.		
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the essentialist and the conventionalist. However, it can perfectly well contain this level of 
specificity (and thus fulfil the metaphysical role) whilst not delivering a definitive answer on 
how many properties must be in the cluster, what level of grain they must be individuated at, 
how mechanisms should be individuated, etc. Without giving clear answers to these 
questions, the HPC view is of limited use in in fulfilling the taxonomic role but it can still 
perfectly well fulfil the metaphysical one. It’s a bad cookie cutter, but it can still be a good 
explanation of what kinds are.12 
Similar things go for the accounts of mechanisms that I have mentioned. The various 
accounts specify what the core features of psychological mechanisms are, what their 
metaphysical structure is. They make use of notions such as ‘changes’, ‘functions’, 
‘dispositions’, ‘component parts’, ‘start and termination conditions’, ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ 
(Bechtel 2008, Illari and Williamson 2012 and Machamer et al. 2000). These accounts do not 
give precise ways to individuate all of these features, so they are of limited use in helping us 
sort out how many mechanisms are present in a given brain area, or in telling us precisely 
where one mechanism ends and another begins. But they needn’t fail at giving us a very 
general account of what mechanisms are. They may fulfil the metaphysical role without 
fulfilling the taxonomic one.  
																																																								
12	P.D.	Magnus	distinguishes	between	what	he	calls	the	‘taxonomy’	question	and	the	‘ontology’	question.	For	
Magnus,	the	taxonomy	question	concerns	what	the	general	features	of	a	class	of	entities	are	that	marks	it	off	as	
a	natural	kind,	rather	than	an	arbitrary	class,	and	the	ontology	question	concerns	what	kind	of	metaphysical	
structure	the	kind	has,	or	what	‘manner	of	stuff’	it	is	made	of	(2015,	p.2.	See	also	Magnus	2014	and	Hawley	and	
Bird	2011).	The	distinction	 suggested	here	 is	 similar	 (the	metaphysical	 role	 is	 similar	 to	Magnus’	ontological	
question),	but	the	taxonomic	role	put	forward	in	this	paper	is	different	from	Magnus’	taxonomy	question.	The	
taxonomic	 role	 considered	 here	 does	 not	 concern	 giving	 the	 general	 features	 that	 distinguish	 kinds	 from	
arbitrary	classes,	but	using	the	HPC	view	as	a	cookie	cutter	to	actually	perform	the	taxonomising	of	kinds	from	
non-kinds.	It	is	this	role	that	I	claim	the	HPC	view	is	ill-suited	to.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	drawing	
my	attention	to	Magnus’	work.	
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This point has far-reaching implications beyond emotions and concepts. For example, 
Carl Craver criticises the HPC view for providing ‘little guidance in arbitrating among 
taxonomies of scientific kinds’ (2009, p.582) and for being ‘unable to settle disputes among 
those who disagree about the taxonomy of natural kinds’ (2009, p.584). With the distinction 
of this section, we can put Craver’s argument in a wider context: he may be correct that the 
HPC view is ill-equipped to do this, but it is important to temper this conclusion with the 
claim that the HPC view may still be worth preserving for other theoretical purposes. 
6. The Indeterminacy View 
Let us summarise. We have examined certain features of the HPC view pertaining to its 
indeterminacy. We have found that because of this indeterminacy, the view is ill-suited to be 
used as a tool to help us divide up kinds and non-kinds (i.e. it is ill-suited to fulfil the 
taxonomic role). So, it cannot help us adjudicate the disputes over whether emotions and 
concepts are natural kinds. In this section, I will outline what I take to be a more profitable 
approach to questions of kindhood, which places less emphasis on using the criteria in the 
HPC view to adjudicate questions of kindhood, and has an increased emphasis on examining 
the explanatory and predictive practices of psychology. I argue that when we do this, the view 
that emerges is that it is indeterminate whether they are kinds or not. 
We have already seen that the HPC view cannot help us decide one way or the other when 
it comes to the kind status of emotions and concepts. Can we not already infer from this to the 
conclusion that it is indeterminate whether they are kinds or not? Such an argument would 
be problematic because it would involve inferring from the fact that the criteria in the HPC 
view fail to give a determinate answer to the question of whether emotions and concepts are 
kinds to the conclusion that it really is indeterminate whether they are kinds or not. This would 
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be to assume that the criteria in the HPC view should be used as the last word on the kind 
status of a group of entities. It would be to use the HPC view as a cookie cutter. We have 
already seen that this is problematic.  
6.1 Practice and kindhood 
We have seen the inadequacy of using the HPC view directly to help us decide on the kind 
status of emotions and concepts. To determine a better way, we should return to the point 
that natural kinds are, most fundamentally, those things that underpin the predictive and 
explanatory successes of a science. This suggests a way of resolving the problems identified. 
Specifically, whether a set of coarse-grained properties and mechanisms shared by a 
particular set of entities qualify those entities for kindhood should not be determined by 
interpretation of the HPC view. Rather, it should be determined by whether those properties 
and mechanisms underpin successful explanations and predictions within psychology. Notice that the 
claim is not just epistemic. It is not just that featuring in predictive/explanatory successes is a 
good guide to kindhood (though it is). It is also metaphysical: it is that featuring in such 
practices is part of what makes something a kind at all. 
This suggests a different method: take the set of coarse-grained properties and 
mechanisms shared by concepts and emotions, and see how they play out in prediction and 
explanation. If they feature in successful prediction and explanation, they are indicative of 
kindhood. If not, they are not. In this way, the question of whether they are definitive of 
kindhood does not come down to an interpretation of the HPC view itself, but rather to what 
features in successful research programmes in psychology. Boyd occasionally hints at an 
approach like this: 
‘considerations of explanatory and inductive significance determine the appropriate 
standards of individuation for the property cluster itself’ (1999b, p.144).  
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It is worth re-iterating why there is a need for such a fresh approach. This need is 
generated by the problems uncovered above, concerning difference of opinion over whether 
emotions and concepts are natural kinds, coupled with the claim that the HPC view itself 
cannot help us here, because indeterminacy in the view makes it a bad cookie cutter. So, the 
issues raised in §§1-5 set up the need for a different approach, and the focus on prediction and 
explanation is just such an approach. 13 
6.2 Emotions and concepts 
Suppose we examine the predictive/explanatory practices that the properties shared by 
emotions and concepts feature in. We might find that they are clearly successful (they feature 
in most or all of the predictions and explanations that form the theory); or we might find that 
they are clearly not successful (they feature in none, or that they feature in predictions which 
are false). If either of these is the case, all well and good: we will have our answer to the one 
way or the other. However, there is a third possibility, which is that they feature in 
explanatory/predictive practices that are neither clearly successful nor clearly unsuccessful. That 
is, we find that the properties shared by concepts and emotions do feature in some 
predictive/explanatory practices, but they are ones that fall within a grey area between success 
and non-success. If this were the case, then our examination of the explanatory/predictive 
practices of psychology would not have fixed an answer to the question of whether emotions 
or concepts are natural kinds: it would have left this question unfixed. They would be neither 
indicative of kindhood, nor of non-kindhood. 
																																																								
13	Obviously,	 I	 do	not	wish	 to	 imply	 that	 the	 various	 interlocutors	 that	 I	 have	discussed	are	unaware	 of	 the	
importance	of	the	predictive	and	explanatory	success	of	the	discipline.	On	the	contrary,	this	issue	is	discussed	
(e.g.	Machery	2009,	p.245;	2010b,	pp.237-8).	My	point	is	just	that	they	over-rely	on	the	criteria	in	the	HPC	view	
itself,	and	that	a	greater	emphasis	on	psychological	practice	is	required.		
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How could explanatory/predictive practices fall within such a grey area? There are several 
ways that this could be the case. Here I outline three. First, if we find that the few properties 
shared by concepts and emotions do feature in predictions and explanations, but they only 
feature in a few such explanations and predictions, compared to the number that can be 
generated by making distinctions between different kinds of concepts and emotions. A second 
way that such explanatory/predictive practices can fall into a grey area between clear success 
and clear non-success is if they do make such predictions/explanations, but that these only 
form background assumptions of the theory in question, rather than those predictions that are 
subject to direct experimental testing. A third way that they could fall into the grey area is if 
they do make certain predictions, but that these predictions have to be made more precise 
before they are tested. These are all ways that the predictive/explanatory successes that the 
properties shared by emotions and concepts could fall into a grey area between clear success 
and non-success.  
Indeed, I think that a combination of these factors is the case for both emotions and 
concepts. I do not have the space for an exhaustive survey of empirical work that is relevant 
to this issue, but I will give two case studies to illustrate my view.14 
Recall that Charland (drawing on Panskepp) claims that emotions share the property of 
being ‘affective appraisals’, which govern and move the behaviour of organisms that have 
emotions (2002, p.512). Griffiths responds by claiming that this category is too broad for 
emotions to count as a natural kind. Given that this is one of the foci of the debate, it will be 
helpful to examine what role the ‘affective appraisal’ property plays in prediction and 
																																																								
14	I	will	focus	on	the	properties	shared	by	concepts	and	emotions,	rather	than	the	mechanisms	that	underpin	
them,	as	 there	 is	more	agreement	about	what	properties	 are	 shared	by	 concepts	 and	emotions,	 so	we	 can	
proceed	without	too	many	contentious	assumptions.	This	does	not	damage	my	argument.	
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explanation. I will take the application of this programme to emotional behaviour in lambs as 
my main case study. 
What we find when we examine the role that the ‘affective appraisal’ property (shared 
across emotions) plays in this inter-species study is that this property is used to support a 
particular prediction. Specifically, it can be used to predict that animals with emotions should 
be able to appraise situations, and instigate reactive behaviour in response to this appraisal. 
Based on this shared property of emotions, it has been predicted that reactive behaviour 
should be seen in lambs, cattle, rats, etc. (Panksepp 2000, p.137; Désiré et al. 2004; Lanier et al. 
2000). When we further examine the way that this overarching prediction features in the work 
on cross-species emotional behaviour, we see that it is a background assumption, which 
motivates the more specific study of emotions in particular species. For example, Désiré et al. 
clearly invoke this prediction in the rationale for their study of emotional behaviour in lambs: 
‘Appraisal theories… are intended to be applicable to different degrees of cognitive 
complexity across species… ‘ (2004, p.363). 
The property of ‘being an affective appraisal’ (shared by emotions) features in a 
prediction, which features as a background motivation to investigate particular sets of 
emotional behaviour in species.15 This may be thought to support the claim that the properties 
shared by emotions are predictively/explanatorily useful. This would, in turn, support the 
claim that emotions are kinds. However, when we examine the predictions that are actually 
subject to experimental testing in this research programme (and the predictions and 
explanations that are most successful), we find that they rely on more fine-grained distinctions 
																																																								
15	Notice	that	the	claim	is	not	that	the	property	of	being	an	affective	appraisal	requires	extensive	background	
assumptions	 in	order	to	be	explanatorily	and	predictively	successful,	but	rather	that	these	properties	can	be	
used	 to	make	predictions	 that	 themselves	 form	only	 a	 background	 assumption	of	 the	 theory.	 Thanks	 to	 an	
anonymous	referee	for	drawing	my	attention	to	this	ambiguity.	
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between different kinds of affective appraisals. These fine-grained distinctions are used to 
make specific behavioural and physiological predictions, and it is these predictions (based on 
these fine-grained properties) that are experimentally tested. 
For example, if we take the fine-grained appraisal faculty that appraises a situation for 
suddenness then we can predict that animals with this appraisal mechanism should exhibit 
startle reflexes and an increased heart rate when exposed to sudden stimuli. A range of 
experiments tested this very fine-grained prediction: an animal is exposed to a sudden 
stimulus and its behavioural/physiological reactions are then measured for particular kinds 
of response, and compared to the predicted startle response (e.g. Désiré et al. 2004, pp.364-6). 
The prediction is confirmed in a wide variety of nonhuman mammals, making it highly 
successful (Désiré et al. 2004, p.371; Yeomans et al. 2002). Then, a fine-grained appraisal 
mechanism for suddenness is postulated to explain this behaviour. 16 Similarly, by using the 
fine-grained property of being an appraisal for novelty, then we can make another specific 
prediction: that on exposure to novel stimuli, animals should exhibit an orienting response 
(evinced by looking behaviour) and a variable heart rate. Such a prediction can be tested: 
expose an animal to novel stimuli, observe its behaviour, and compare the behaviour to the 
predicted orienting response. Again, this prediction is widely confirmed (Turpin 1986; 
Bertson et al. 1992; Désiré et al. 2004).17 Such behaviours and physiological reactions would be 
explained by postulation of a different appraisal mechanism that appraises for novelty. 18   
																																																								
16	Cf.	Scherer	(2001,	pp.114-115),	where	particular	predictions	are	made	by	dividing	the	category	of	‘affective	
appraisals’	up	into	sub-kinds	of	emotion.	
17	Lambs	were	also	tested	for	their	responses	to	unpredictability,	but	the	results	are	less	clear-cut	(Désiré	et	al.	
2004,	p.373).	
18	Charland	comments	that	emotional	behaviour	cannot	be	explained	without	using	affective	terms,	a	point	he	
takes	to	support	emotion’s	kind	status	(2002,	p.523).	This	doesn’t	vindicate	emotion	as	a	kind.	My	claim	is	about	
the	limitations	in	the	predictive	and	explanatory	power	of	the	coarse-grained	property	‘affective	appraisal’.	The	
theoretical	indispensability	of	particular	affective	terms	(such	as	‘novelty’)	is	compatible	with	this.	
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We have examined the predictive/explanatory role of the abstract property of ‘being an 
affective appraisal’ that is shared by all emotions. We have found that the role it plays in the 
theory is not straightforwardly clearly successful or clearly unsuccessful: it does feature in 
predictions, which feature in the theory as background assumptions. However, the 
predictions and explanations that are made using the more fine-grained properties that are 
not shared across all emotions are those that the experiments primarily test, and those that are 
most clearly successful. We will come back to what this means for kindhood shortly, but first 
let us return to concepts. As we saw above, a core question about concepts is whether the 
property (possessed by all concepts) of conceptual combination qualifies concepts for 
kindhood. To adjudicate this, we should look at whether this property features in successful 
predictions/explanations. 
We can take Costello and Keane (2000) as a case study, as they give a computational 
model of conceptual combination that makes use of exemplars, theories and prototypes. On 
this view, when atomic concepts are combined, there are several possible distinct 
interpretations of the resultant complex concept. That is to say, there are several possible 
meanings that could be assigned to the complex concept that is the output of the combination 
process. According to Costello and Keane, these interpretations are judged along three 
dimensions, and the most plausible interpretation (based on these criteria) is assigned to the 
combined concept (2000). 
In this model, the general coarse-grained property shared by all concepts (that they are 
involved in conceptual combination) figures to generate a certain prediction: that concepts of 
all kinds (exemplars, theories, prototypes) should be combinable to generate new concepts. 
This features as an assumption in the background of Costello and Keane’s theory. They 
assume that all kinds of concepts (exemplars, theories and prototypes) are accessible to the 
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combination process, and can be used by these processes to generate conceptual combinations 
(2000, pp.305-306). That is to say, they take the property of ‘being available to conceptual 
combination’, and assume that this property is a feature of all concepts, and they use this as a 
background assumption in their theory. This assumption allows them to explain features of 
complex concepts by reference to the fact that the many individual kinds of concepts (such as 
prototypes, exemplars or theories) are all inputs to the combinatorial process.  
To put all of this in simpler terms: Costello and Keane refer to the fact that all concepts 
work as input to the combinational process in their explanation of how complex concepts are 
formed. This is the assumption that all kinds of concepts are available for combination at 
work. So here we see the property of ‘being available for conceptual combination’ functioning 
as part of the explanatory apparatus of the theory. 
However, in order to predict which particular meanings will be assigned to certain 
particular complex concepts (and explain how they acquired those properties), we must refer 
to particular features of specific sub-types of concepts. For example, in explaining how complex 
concepts can have emergent properties,19 Costello and Keane make reference specifically to 
exemplars, and claim that it is exemplars over which the computational processes operate (at 
least in these cases) (2000, p.34, Gray and Smith 1995).20 Here we refer to exemplars in giving 
our prediction of which properties a certain complex concept has, and explaining how it could 
have such emergent properties. The abstract and coarse-grained property of ‘being available 
to conceptual combination’ that is shared by all concepts cannot do this, because it is 
																																																								
19 	Emergent	 properties	 are	 typical	 properties	 of	 the	 referents	 of	 complex	 concepts,	 which	 aren’t	 typical	
properties	of	the	referents	of	their	constituent	concepts.	For	example,	people	typically	associate	properties	such	
as	‘small’,	‘pretty’	and	‘caged’	with	pet	birds,	even	though	these	aren’t	properties	typically	possessed	by	pets	or	
birds.		
20	The	claim	is	that	in	interpreting	PET	BIRD,	we	retrieve	memories	of		instances	of	pet	birds,	and	then	use	their	
properties	(being	small	and	in	a	cage)	to	interpret	the	complex	concept.		
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insensitive to the particular specific properties of certain sub-types of atomic concepts (not 
shared by all concepts) that are an indispensable part of the explanation. 
 Other cases of conceptual combination need to make use of prototypes specifically. Take 
the hypothetical case of the complex concept CACTUS FISH. Costello and Keane take the 
correct interpretation of this complex concept to be something like ‘a prickly fish’. One factor 
contributing to this prediction is that prickliness is a typical feature of cacti (thus explaining 
why a cactus fish would be prickly). The encoding of typical properties is a feature of  
prototypes (cf. Johnson and Keil 2000). So prototypical features figure in the prediction and 
explanation of which particular interpretation is given of the complex concept. 21 
Recall that we decided to settle the question of kindhood by asking whether the 
properties shared across emotions and across concepts were explanatorily and predictively 
successful. We took ‘affective appraisals’ and ‘availability to conceptual combination’ as our 
examples of properties shared by emotions and shared by concepts respectively, because 
these are two core sources of disagreement in the debates over emotions and concepts. What 
are we to make of our investigation? Take the predictive/explanatory practices that the 
properties shared across concepts, and across emotions feature in. Should we say that they 
are successful or that they are unsuccessful? Above I said that an explanatory/predictive practice 
can fall into a grey area between successful and unsuccessful. This would be the case if the 
predictions feature only as a background assumption of the theory, or if there are only a few 
																																																								
21	It	may	be	replied	that	(assuming	Costello	and	Keane’s	basic	model	to	be	correct)	conceptual	combination	is	
governed	 by	 the	 same	 three	 criteria	 in	 all	 instances	 (plausibility,	 diagnostic	 accuracy	 and	 informativeness	
(2000)).	 This	 may	 be	 taken	 to	 be	 evidence	 of	 shared	 properties	 possessed	 by	 concepts,	 which	 feature	
prominently	in	the	theory,	thus	supporting	kindhood.	But	this	inference	wouldn’t	be	right	for	two	reasons.	First,	
it	is	doubtful	that	the	criteria	do	govern	the	combination	of	all	concepts,	as	they	only	account	for	noun-noun	
combinations,	and	cannot	account	for	metaphor	(Costello	and	Keane	2000,	pp.303-304;	Keane	1997).	Second,	
the	fact	 that	they	govern	conceptual	combination	 is	not	really	a	shared	feature	of	concepts	themselves,	but	
rather	of	the	combinational	process	that	operates	over	concepts.		
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predictions and explanations compared to those that are generated by more specific 
properties, or if further refinement is required before the predictions are experimentally 
tested. In such cases, it is neither clearly the case that these practices are sufficiently successful, 
nor that they are clearly unsuccessful.  
I have argued through an examination of two case studies that this is the case with the 
properties shared by concepts and emotions. Both of them do generate predictions that are 
part of the background of the theory, but they generate only a few predictions compared to 
those generated by more specific properties, and both of them require refinement before the 
predictions that are primarily tested in each case. In the emotions case, they generate the 
prediction that all emotional animals should show certain reactive behaviours (which is a 
background assumption of the theory), but distinctions are made between different kinds of 
reactive behaviour in the predictions that are tested. In the concepts case, they generate the 
assumption that all concepts are available for combination (which is a background 
assumption of the theory), but this property is refined to explain the meanings assigned to 
particular complex concepts in particular cases. In a nutshell, it is unclear whether to say that 
these practices are ‘successful’ or not, because they do produce certain 
predictions/explanations, but it is just not clear whether these are successful enough.  
The message is this: psychology makes use of a range of predictive/explanatory practices. 
Some of them are clearly successful and others are clearly unsuccessful. However, with 
emotions and concepts, it is not like that. Rather, they have certain features that make it very 
unclear whether to think of them as successful or not. They fall into the grey area. This is the 
main conclusion of this subsection. We should now turn to the link between this claim and 
psychological natural kindhood. 
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6.3. Indeterminacy 
We now have two claims on the table. The first is that we should judge the kind status of 
emotions and concepts by whether they feature in successful explanatory/predictive practices 
in psychology (rather than using the HPC view as a cookie cutter). This is a methodological 
claim. The second is that, upon investigation, these practices fall within a grey area between 
success and unsuccess. This is an empirical claim. We can now marry these claims. The result 
is that the natural kind status of emotions and concepts remains unfixed by the practices of 
psychology. Thus, given the current state of psychological research it is simply indeterminate 
whether concepts or emotions are natural kinds. This I call the indeterminacy view.  
Note that I am not saying that it is indeterminate whether concepts and emotions are 
kinds because they share only a few coarse-grained mechanisms and properties in common. 
That in itself would not be a problem, if these coarse-grained properties/mechanisms and 
properties were highly successful in the theoretical context of psychology. Rather, the 
indeterminacy arises from the particular role that these properties play in the 
predictive/explanatory practices of psychology.  
An objector may resist this conclusion. They may accept the case studies of §6.2, and 
accept that emotions and concepts play a modest role in predictions/explanations in 
psychology. However, they may take this to support the claim that they are natural kinds after 
all, on the basis that they play at least some predictive/explanatory role. It will be instructive to 
unpick the reasoning of this objection. The objection infers from the claim that emotions and 
concepts possess properties that support some modest explanatory/predictive practices to the 
conclusion that they are kinds. In order for this inference to work, we need to make an 
additional assumption: that these sorts of modest predictive and explanatory practices are 
sufficient to qualify a set of entities for kindhood. But this additional assumption is not itself 
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justified by an examination of the explanatory and predictive practices of psychology. 
Psychology itself does not fix whether these modest explanatory and predictive practices are 
sufficient for kind status. To see the problematic nature of this assumption, consider that 
another thinker may make the converse assumption: they may assume that these modest 
explanatory/predictive successes are so modest that they indicate that emotions and concepts 
are not kinds. But both of these inferences are unsatisfactory. Both of these inferences partially 
involve examination of psychological practice (in order to establish the modest 
predictive/explanatory practices that concepts and emotions figure in). However, they also 
both essentially rely on assumptions about the link between these modest 
predictive/explanatory practices and kind status. These assumptions themselves are not 
supported by examination of psychological practice because whilst psychology makes use of 
a range of such practices, it does not fix a precise point at which they qualify for kindhood. 
We should be wary of such assumptions that do not themselves derive from an examination 
of psychology. 
Three clarifications: first, the indeterminacy view is not epistemic. It is not that we just 
don’t know whether concepts or emotions are natural kinds. Rather, it really is indeterminate 
whether they are or not. To repeat a point made above, this is because the kind status of a 
group of entities is determined (at least in part) by the explanatory/predictive practices of 
science, and these practices (in this case) do not fix the answer one way or the other. Second, 
the indeterminacy view could change in the future, if the explanatory/predictive practices of 
psychology change enough. There is nothing suspicious about this. Part of what makes 
something a kind at all is how it features in scientific practice, so we would expect kinds to 
change depending on the state of the science. Third, note that this indeterminacy is different 
from other kinds of indeterminacies that have been pointed out before. It is known that HPC 
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natural kinds can have extensions that do not have sharp boundaries (Boyd 1999b, p.144). The 
indeterminacy argued for here is quite different: it is that it can be indeterminate whether a 
particular category is a kind or not at all, regardless of whether its extension is sharp.22 
7. The consequences of indeterminacy 
Suppose we accept that it is indeterminate whether emotions and concepts are natural kinds. 
What are the consequences of this view? I highlight three. First, one of the overriding 
assumptions fuelling the debates over the kind status of emotions and concepts is that 
psychology’s practices have a certain neatness: that there is a clear cut answer to whether a 
certain faculty is a natural kind. If the indeterminacy view is taken seriously, this is false. The 
practices of psychology are just messier than that. Different sorts of messiness in psychology 
have been noted before. For example, I have previously argued that psychology sometimes 
uses a variety of different concepts for the same phenomenon, which carve up the mind 
differently (Taylor 2017).  It has also been shown that there can be a fuzzy boundary between 
two psychological kinds (Buckner 2015). The current paper is in agreement with these views 
in spirit, and adds to them another kind of messiness: indeterminacy over whether something 
is a kind at all. Of course, these results have repercussions beyond philosophy of psychology, 
to our general view of the unity (or disunity) of science itself (e.g. Dupré 1993). 
																																																								
22	Magnus	(2012,	pp.47-55)	discusses	a	similar	point:	that	kinds	can	be	more	or	less	natural	depending	on	the	
strength	of	the	science’s	epistemic	success.	My	point	here	is	in	the	same	spirit,	but	different:	it	is	that	it	can	be	
entirely	indeterminate	whether	something	is	a	kind	at	all,	not	just	that	kinds	themselves	come	on	a	spectrum.	
Magnus	is	also	motivated	by	more	overarching	concerns	in	the	philosophy	of	science,	rather	than	specific	issues	
about	psychological	kindhood.	Magnus	himself	places	two	constraints	on	kindhood:	that	they	support	inductive	
and	explanatory	success	in	the	discipline,	and	they	be	necessary	for	this	success	(he	calls	this	latter	criterion	the	
‘restriction	clause’	and	develops	alternative	versions	of	 it	 (2012,	pp.48-67)).	Notice	that	we	can	accept	these	
criteria	 on	 kindhood	 and	 still	 accept	 that	 it	 is	 indeterminate	 whether	 concepts	 and	 emotions	 are	 kind.	 If	
emotions	and	concepts	are	necessary	for	modest	predictive	and	explanatory	practices	they	feature	in,	then	it	
would	not	be	clear	whether	the	practices	qualified	them	for	kind	status	in	the	first	place.	
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The second consequence of the indeterminacy view regards the kind status of other 
mental faculties such as consciousness, perception, seeing, the senses, constancy. If the 
arguments of this paper are correct, then we can add the indeterminacy view as a contender 
view of these faculties. Of course, I am not saying that it really is indeterminate whether these 
faculties are kinds. Clearly that would require further argumentation. My claim is only that 
the indeterminacy view should be put on the table as an option in these debates. 
To see the third consequence of the indeterminacy view, consider that the claim that 
concepts and emotions are not a natural kind is often used as sufficient reason for eliminativism 
about the terms ‘concept’ and ‘emotion’: that they should be dropped from our scientific 
terminology. Likewise, the converse claim that concepts and emotions are natural kinds is 
often given to justify preservation of these terms. If the indeterminacy view is accepted, it will 
mean that both sides of the debate are wrong: natural kinds cannot be used to support 
eliminativism or preservationism, because both options require there to be a determinate 
answer to the question of kindhood. 
 With the indeterminacy view, natural kinds would be powerless to help us decide what 
to say here. Yet we must say something, as it is a profoundly important question about 
whether radical conceptual change is required in psychology or not.  At this point, we have 
two options. The first would be to stick with the assumption that the terminology of science 
should track natural kinds, and then infer from the claim that it is indeterminate whether 
emotions and concepts are natural kinds to the conclusion that it is simply indeterminate 
whether the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘concept’ should be eliminated or preserved. The second 
would be to reject the assumption that natural kinds should be the overriding factor in 
dictating scientific terminology, and to settle the eliminativism/preservationism question 
based on other factors. Myself and Peter Vickers have made suggestions like this in the 
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literature before. We have argued that the most important factor in adjudicating disputes over 
eliminativism should be purely pragmatic factors to do with how much the term is liable to 
promote verbal disputes and other methodological problems, rather than whether the term 
refers to a kind (Taylor and Vickers 2017). Whether this pragmatic approach will ultimately 
work out, we must leave for another time.23 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
23	Thanks	to	Ned	Block,	Robin	Hendry,	Maja	Spener,	Peter	Vickers	and	three	anonymous	reviewers	for	comments	
on	previous	drafts	of	this	paper.	Thanks	also	to	Edouard	Machery	for	helpful	conversation.	I	am	grateful	to	the	
Leverhulme	Trust	and	the	Isaac	Newton	Trust	for	an	Early	Career	Fellowship	(ECF-2015-088)	that	supported	me	
while	the	paper	was	written.	The	research	for	this	paper	started	with	my	PhD	thesis.	I	am	thankful	to	Durham	
University	 for	 a	 Durham	 Doctoral	 Studentship,	 and	 to	 the	 Royal	 Institute	 of	 Philosophy	 for	 a	 Jacobsen	
Studentship	that	supported	me	during	this	work.	
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